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THE PROPOSED F.T.C. GREEN GUIDES
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I. INTRODUCTION
C onsumer interest in all things "green," a trend dating back to
the 197os and the advent of Earth Day, has gained
momentum in recent years, leading to a surge in the availability
of products purporting to be environmentally friendly. As
consumers increasingly found themselves lost in a thicket of
environmental advertising claims on television, in print, and on
packaging, the need for consumer protection in this area grew as
well. In response, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
established the Green Guides (Guides) in 1992 to assist companies
in determining appropriate means for making claims about the
environmental benefits of their products.' The Guides were
revised in 1996 and 19982 in response to consumer research and
new developments in companies' marketing strategies.3 The
Green Guides are currently under review, as the FTC determines
J.D. Candidate, May 2oo, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
Complying with the Environmental Marketing Guides, http://www.ftc.
gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/greenguides.shtm (last visited May 15, 2oo8),
2.
2 Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, i6 C.F.R. § 260
(1998), 72 Fed. Reg. 66,o9i (Nov. 27, 2007) at 2.
' Roscoe B. Starek, III, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Prepared
Remarks Before the Alliance for Beverage Cartons and the Environmental
Symposium: The Federal Trade Commission's Green Guides: A Success Story
(Dec. 4, 1996) at 27.
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whether to retain, modify or rescind them.4
As the Federal Trade Commission solicits comments for
revisions to the Green Guides, a number of questions about the
Guides' efficacy present themselves: How successful have the
Guides been in promoting accurate environmental advertising
claims? Is there a more effective way of formulating the Guides
to promote consumers' environmental interests? Would
consumers and companies benefit from a partnership between the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the FTC? Should
the Guides be abandoned altogether in favor of an alternative
regulatory strategy, such as eco-labeling?
This comment takes into account these questions in
examining the effectiveness of the Guides in preventing
companies from using false and misleading environmental
advertising. Part II traces the development of the Guides and
their regulatory goals. Part III evaluates the extent to which the
Guides have met those goals. Part IV suggests alternative
approaches that promote the goals of the Guides in a manner
more likely to induce compliance and create predictability for
consumers and manufacturers while encouraging companies to
adopt, increasingly stringent environmental standards for their
products.
II. THE GREEN GUIDES' ORIGINS
Since the advent of products with "environmentally
friendly" qualities, determining a course of action in regulating
environmental claims has been a complicated process requiring a
considerable measure of compromise.5 After two decades of
4 72 Fed. Reg. 66,o9I, supra note 2, at 4. Among other things, the
Commission is seeking to identify whether there is an ongoing need for the
Guides, what benefits consumers derive from them, what impact the Guides
have had on the flow of accurate advertising information, what costs
,consumers bear as a result of the Guides, whether consumer perceptions or
interests have changed with regards to environmental claims, there has been
substantial industry compliance with the Guides, whether there is overlap with
other federal, state, or local regulations, and whether international standards
should be considered in the FTC's review of the Guides.
' The quest to curtail deceptive environmental claims dates back to the
early I97Os, when the Federal Trade Commission worked with industry to
create an agreement on phosphate and degradeability claims. At that early
stage, FTC cases challenged deceptive environmental advertising claims in
several areas, including air pollution claims made by gasoline manufacturers.
(See FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California as cited in Starek, supra note 3).
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investigating claims of misleading and deceptive environmental
advertising on a case-by-case basis, the FTC responded to state
and consumer concerns by creating the Guides in 1992.6
Motivated in part by a desire to avoid the perceived problems of
discordant state legislation, the FTC intended that the Guides
provide a uniform means of regulating manufacturers'
environmental marketing and advertising practices.7  The
Guides' stated purpose is to "provide the basis for voluntary
compliance with such laws [Section 5 of the FTC Act] by
members of industry."8  They "are not themselves enforceable
regulations, nor do they have the force and effect of law", but
companies found to be in violation of their recommendations may
be subject to sanctions under Section 5 of the FTC Act.9
The Guides include general principles that apply to all
environmental advertising as well as guidance in crafting specific
environmental claims. 10 They contain explanations about how
reasonable consumers are likely to interpret a number of
statements that fall into eight categories: general environmental
benefit claims; degradable claims; compostable claims; recyclable
claims; recycled content claims; source reduction claims; refillable
claims; and ozone safe/ozone friendly claims." Each of the
categories includes examples designed to aid companies in
determining how to appropriately qualify their environmental
claims.12 These examples are intended to provide a non-exclusive
Increases in consumer concerns about the environment in the i98os led not
only to increases in the number of manufacturers' environmental claims, but
also to an FTC investigation into violations of the FTC Act's Section 5, which
regulates false and deceptive advertising. Starek, supra note 3, at 4-5.
6 Id. at 7.
7 Id.; 16 C.F.R. § 26o.1.
8 16 C.F.R. § 26o.i.
9 72 Fed. Reg. 66,o9I, supra note 2, at 3; 16 C.F.R. § 260.2.
10 72 Fed. Reg. 66,o9I, supra note 2, at 3. The Guides require "that
qualifications and disclosures be sufficiently clear and prominent to prevent
deception based on "clarity of language, relative type size and proximity to the
claim being qualified, and an absence of contrary claims that could undercut
effectiveness"; that *marketers make clear whether their claims apply to the
product, the package, or a component of either; that claims to not overstate an
environmental attribute or benefit, expressly or by implication; and that
marketers present comparative claims in a manner that makes the basis for the
comparison sufficiently clear to avoid consumer deception.", i6 C.F.R. § 26o.6.
1 Id. at 4.
12 Id. For example, under the general principle that environmental claims
should not be overstated, a trash bag labeled "recyclable" without qualification
is misleading. Although the claim may be technically accurate, the fact that
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list of "safe harbors" that companies can rely on in order to ensure
that they will not draw the FTC's attention.13
Significantly, the Guides' standards are not based on
technical distinctions between and rigid definitions of
environmental terms, but rather on what the FTC believes those
terms mean to consumers. 4 In the words of one commissioner,
the Guides require that "any and all reasonable interpretations
that are likely to affect consumers' conduct or decisions regarding
a product or service must be substantiated, whether or not the
advertiser intended to make those claims."' 5  Advertisers must
therefore answer to the FTC not just for intended claims that can
be substantiated, but also any implied claims in which the
consumer may reasonably believe, regardless of whether there is a
technical connection between the claim and interpretation.16 The
current contemplated revisions are partly targeted at ensuring
that consumer perception is accounted for, because "science and
technology in the environmental area are constantly changing
and new developments might affect consumer perception."' 7
Meanwhile, states have not refrained entirely from
regulating in this area, despite the possibility of federal
preemption. Private companies and independent organizations
such as Green Seal have also sprung up to fill voids in product
regulation.18 Because the Guides do not have the force of law,
trash bags are usually not separated out for recycling means that the claim has
no practical value, and it "asserts an environmental benefit where no
significant or meaningful benefit exists." The Guides suggest that other claims
making overly broad statements of environmental benefit be qualified as much
as possible to ensure that the claim cannot possibly cause confusion. For
example, a product package labeled "environmentally friendly because it was
not chlorine bleached, a process that has been shown to create harmful
substances" can still be deceptive, and requires additional qualification if the
product's manufacturing process does harm to the environment in some other
way. i6 C.F.R. § 260.2(c). Similarly, the Ice Mountain commercial touting the
environmental benefit of its water bottles which use "30 percent less plastic" is
misleading under FTC guidelines because it does not indicate whether it uses
30 percent less plastic than it did previously in its water bottles, or 30 percent
less plastic than its competitors use. 16 C.F.R. § 26o.2(d).
13 Id.
'" Starek, supra note 3, at 14.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 72 Fed. Reg. 66,o9I, supra note 2, at 5.
8 Kimberly C. Cavanagh, It's a Lorax Kind of Market! But is it. a
Sneeches Kind of Solution?: a Critical Review'of Current Laissez-Faire
Environmental Marketing Regulation, 9 VA. ENVTL L.J. 133, 145 (1998). An
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they cannot preempt regulations created by other federal
agencies, or state and local governments. 9 The result is a wide
variation of state and local regulation.2" Some states have
attempted to follow the Guides, several have shifted their focus to
consumer education and state-based product labeling programs,
and at least one, California, has enacted more stringent
measures.2 1 The Ninth Circuit's 1994 decision in Association of
Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren2 upheld a stringent California
regulation likely ensuring that this patchwork state approach to
environmental advertising regulation will continue unless
preempted by federal legislation.23 Attempting to capitalize on
gaps in state and federal regulations, independent organizations
and private companies like the Scientific Certification Systems'
"Environmental Report Card" have formed to provide more
extensive product information for consumers.2 4 These programs
typically combine attempts to establish a rating or certification
additional layer of environmental oversight exists at the international level,
through both the United Nations and less geographically extensive treaty
organizations such as the GATT and NAFTA. Private international groups
like the International Standards Organization (ISO) fill a role similar to private
groups in the United States by seeking to create and encourage compliance
with voluntary standards in an attempt to "harmonize methodologies, terms
and principles" at the international level. As with domestic systems,
international standards by government-like entities have combined with
private groups o create a multi-tiered and overlapping system of regulations
and certification programs which currently rely on weak or questionable
enforcement mechanisms. Id. at 139-48.
19 16 C.F.R. § 260.2.
21 Cavanagh, supra note i8, at 144.
21 Id. Cavanagh provides an extensive discussion about the variety of
state-run programs and their relation to the Green Guides, and ultimately
concludes that federal legislation will be necessary to preempt the plethora of
state-run programs that currently exist which severely limit the predictability
of effective advertising for marketers and which the FTC is powerless to
curtail. Id. at 177-84, 189-9o.
22 44 F.3 d 726 (9 th Cir. 1994).
23 Cavanagh, supra note i8 at 144-45. This decision involved a challenge
to California's Environmental Marketing Act, and the Court's opinion
classified environmental advertising claims as commercial speech rather than
political speech, removing it from the protection of the First Amendment and
making it an open issue for state and federal regulation. In addition, because
the court found that a substantial state interest existed in California's
environmental marketing statute, this precedent makes it likely that an
appropriately worded federal statute would be found constitutional. Id. at
192-94.
24 Id. at 145-46, 201.
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system for environmental attributes of products with incentives
for companies that develop more environmentally friendly
products."
III. THE GREEN GUIDES: A SUCCESS STORY?
A. The Guides as a Regulatory Achievement
Many feel the Guides have been an important step
towards the FTC's goal of creating predictable environmental
advertising standards for both businesses and consumers. In a
1996 speech in Belgium, Roscoe Starek III, then FTC
commissioner, framed the Guides as a nearly unqualified success
story.26 In casting consumers as a group that "can easily be
fooled," he lauded the FTC for creating a framework of voluntary
compliance to prevent consumers from spending money on "the
wrong products or services, injuring both the consumer and more
honest competitors."27  He indicated that providing companies
with an idea of the evidence they should have to support their
environmental claims allowed the FTC to "encourage advertisers
to make genuine environmental improvements with the incentive
of being able confidently to advertise those improvements to the
public. '2 8
Others see the most recent round of Guides revisions as
the FTC taking a hardline stance on those marketers "seeking to
turn green advertising claims into gold."29 For those marketers
who feel that.having "green" credentials is necessary in order to
improve sales with today's consumers, understanding the likely
consumer interpretations of their advertising claims is
paramount.30 Although companies may feel increasing pressure
to tout their products' green attributes, marketers should exercise
caution in making claims until the FTC unveils its new
recommendations because marketers cannot necessarily predict
25 Id.
26 Starek, supra note 3, at i.
27 Id. at 2, 3. The Guides, then,' arose to combat "confusion about
environmental claims [that] simultaneously kept useful information from
reaching consumers and left them distrustful about the information they did
receive." Id. at 7.
28 Id. at 9.
29 Wendy Melillo, POV: It's Not Easy Being Green, ADWEEK, Jan. 15,
2o08, available at www.adweek.com (click on "news," click on "strategy," scroll
down to locate article), i.
20 Id. at 9.
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how the FTC will respond to changing consumer perception. 31
Believing that it is in the best interests of both consumers and
marketers to understand environmental claims and how to make
them accurate, one article warns that "this is not the time for
marketers to play in the green marketing arena if they don't
understand the game." The clear implication is that, regardless
of how the FTC has dealt with violations of its suggestions in the
past, companies should anticipate and pay close attention to
changes that the FTC will unveil at the end of the Green Guide
revision process. Although companies do not have to fear strict
penalties for Guide violations, they can nevertheless avoid the
hassle of an FTC investigation, a potential Section 5 sanction,
and negative media and consumer attention by exercising caution
in environmental advertising until the new Guides are
published.33
B. The Green Guides' Enforcement Downside
Not all observers have been as cheerfully optimistic about
the Green Guides' success as former FTC Commissioner Starek.
A number of authors and studies have noted the FTC's failure to
investigate companies' questionable advertising claims,34 and
some seriously doubt the Guides' effectiveness in affecting
companies' environmental advertising.35  Worse still, some
believe that the FTC's steadfast belief that deceptive
environmental advertising is "merely" a form of misleading
advertising that belongs only within the purview of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (Act) forecloses a number of possible
regulatory strategies that are better suited for use with
environmental marketing issues.36 Moreover, companies whose
products are found to violate the Guides' recommendations are
subject to only limited sanctions under Section 5 of the Act,
which has usually resulted in the FTC signing consent
agreements with the offending company. Generally, this
31 Id. at 8, 11.
32 Id. at 7, 8.
11 See 72 Fed. Reg. 66,o9i, supra note 2, at 5, 7-
14 Heather Green, How Green is That Gizmo?, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 20,
2007, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/o7-53/
b4o65o362I5848.htm, 5.
31 Cavanagh, supra note i8, at .156 n.89.
36 Id. at 139.
" Id. at 12.
2008]
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amounts to little more than a cooperative and effectively
voluntary sanction, with companies agreeing to discontinue the
deceptive advertising and the FTC placing them under a broad
cease and desist order prohibiting future misleading claims.38
A recent investigation by TerraChoice Environmental
Marketing revealed that false and misleading claims are slipping
past the FTC at alarming rates.39  TerraChoice reviewed the
environmental claims made for about i,oi8 widely sold goods
and determined that all but one made a false or misleading claim
under FTC guidelines. 40 The majority of claims fell into three
categories of transgressions: "Sin of the Hidden Trade-Off," "Sin
of No Proof," and "Sin of Irrelevance. '41 TerraChoice defined the
"Hidden Trade-Off" category to include touting one
environmental benefit of a product without mentioning the same
product's economic downside, "No Proof" includes products
which have not certified their claims, and "Irrelevance" includes
claiming an environmental benefit that the law already requires,
such as marketing a product as having "no chlorofluorocarbons"
when CFCs were banned three decades ago." Although given
different names by the Green Guides, all three categories
constitute deceptive advertising that should subject the offending
companies to Section 5 investigations.
TerraChoice also commented on the proliferation of
innovative environmental claims that do not yet fall under the
Guides, including carbon offsets and renewable energy
certificates.43
With so much media and consumer attention given to
earth-friendly products, it is not surprising that some
manufacturers are trying to capitalize unscrupulously on the
green movement. One observer notes that "there is a great abuse
of green marketing going on"'44 with "a real lack of authenticity to
a lot of the ads that is really disingenuous with the problem we
have in the environment. 45  Companies have a valuable
38 Id.
39 Green, supra note 34 at 3.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 4.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 5.
44 Andrea Billups, FTC Review Rules to Keep Advertisers True "Green,"
THE WASH. TIMEs, March 4, 2o8, available at http://www.washington
times.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/2oo8o 3 o4 /NATION/i6oo89433/IOOI,
45 Id.
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incentive to follow that path: Research shows that companies that
do not embrace environmental issues may lose their consumer
base, and a 2007 consumer survey found that eighty-five percent
of people surveyed would switch brands or products if a company
had poor corporate responsibility practices.46
An additional problem with the Guides is the seemingly
arbitrary distinctions that result from its attempts to mold
subjective assessments of consumer confidence into a set of
objective recommendations for marketers. An example of this is
the set of regulations related to the "chasing arrows" symbol 47.
Conspicuous display of the symbol creates a recyclability claim
subject to the Guides' suggestions, while discrete placement of
the symbol, such as on the bottom of the package, does not.4
Given that a substantial number of products display the symbol
on the bottom of the container, it is reasonable to believe that
consumers not only expect to find the symbol there, but rely on it
just as heavily to determine the product's recyclability as they
would if the symbol were displayed on the product's label.
Seeming discrepancies like these make it difficult to determine
the degree to which the Guides' recommendations truly accord
with the consumer perceptions they are supposed to authenticate.
C. Errors of Omission: The Changing Face of "Green"
Critics make a compelling argument that the Guides, in
addition to being under-enforced and arbitrary, are simply out of
touch with current environmental marketing realities. A decade-
long drought in revisions means that more recent technologies
and advertising strategies are largely unregulated, including
carbon offsets, renewable energy certificates, and green building
products.49 In some cases, this failure to articulate standards has
46 Id. at i9.
" See i6 C.F.R. § 260.7(d), Example 2.
48 16 C.F.R. § 26o.7(d).
49 See David A. Fahrenthold, Value of U.S. House's Carbon Offsets is
Murky, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 199o, at Ai. See also FTC Examines Green
Building, New Green Guides 'Definitely' in 2009, Environmental Leader, July
16, 2 oo8, http://www.environmentalleader.com/2 oo8/07/i 6/ftc-examines-green-
building-new-green-guides-definitely-in-2oo9/. Although this article does not
address it as a separate consumer issue, the FTC has held meetings in order to
determine whether new developments in green building advertising should fall
within the purvey of the revised 2oo9 Green Guides. Despite the fact that
green building advertising has not been specifically regulated in the past, the
issues related to green building advertising largely mirror the concerns about
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created an almost complete lack of reliable consumer
information. 0 Even more problematic is the debate over just
what claims these products are making and what the businesses
that provide and purchase them should be required to show as
proof of legitimate advertising.
One particular area of concern is the voluntary carbon
offset and renewable energy certificate market, which has sprung
up in recent years and quickly surged in popularity.
Corporations and consumers in the United States spent more
than $54 million on voluntary carbon offsets in 2007 alone,5 1 and
the total value of the-2006 voluntary carbon exchange market is
estimated to have been around $91 million." Even the United
States government has gotten involved, with the House of
Representatives spending $89,00o on carbon offsets in 2007 . 51
Events ranging from the Super Bowl to the Academy Awards
have touted themselves as "carbon-neutral" and carbon offset
promotional offers abound in the marketplace. 4 Companies from
Dell to Volkswagen to Delta Airlines now all offer some form of
carbon offset, either as part of a purchase or as an independent
product offered for sale.55
green advertising as a whole.
50 See id.
" Louise Story, F.TC. Asks if Carbon-Offset Money is Well Spent, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2oo8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2oo8/oi/og/business/
o9offsets.html?_r=i&oref=slogin. Many of these offsets are traded on open
markets the Chicago Climate Exchange, but they can also be purchased
directly from and managed by companies like Carbonfund.org and the
Conservation Fund.
52 Jeffrey Ball and Ian Talley, Scrutiny Rises Over Carbon-Offset Sales
Process, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2oo8 at AI 3 . According to the World Bank, the
global market for regulated-emissions permits reached $3o billion in 2006.
Although many companies anticipate that the United States government will
impose caps on global warming emissions, the government has yet to do so,
making carbon offsets an optional, and currently unregulated, expense.
Countries trading carbon offset permits under the Kyoto Protocol are
regulated by a panel of United Nations-sanctioned officials.
13 Fahrenthold, supra note 49, at Ai.
4 Story, supra note 5 1.
5 Id. Dell, for example, offers carbon offsets for sale on its website,
ranging from $2 for three years of laptop use to $99 for a consumer's total
annual emissions. For a limited time, Volkswagen incorporated a carbon
offset program into each vehicle purchase, promising to plant trees in its "VW
Forest" in Mississippi. Delta has balked at including the charge in their fares,
due to the especially price-sensitive nature of airline fares, but they offer
carbon offsets as an optional additional charge. Major rewards credit cards
have also gotten into the game, offering to exchange points for carbon offsets.
[V01. 2 1: 1
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Carbon offsets do just what their name suggests: They
permit individuals or businesses to emit greenhouse gases at their
current rates, but mitigate that pollution by paying to create or
improve upon clean energy technology in other locations. 56 The
idea is that, after exhausting possible changes to reduce a
company's greenhouse gas emissions, the company can further
reduce its environmental impact by funding outside
environmental programsI Each carbon offset is supposed to
equate to one metric ton of carbon dioxide that is prevented from
entering the atmosphere.8 Money paid to a carbon offset
program is directed to alternative energy development and
sustainability initiatives throughout the country, including solar
and wind energy installments, reforestation programs,5 9 and
agricultural practice improvements.60  Contracts for similar
"carbon credit" programs are currently being traded on the
Chicago Climate Exchange, which lists 400 members, including
Sony, DuPont, Bank of America, the state of Illinois, and the city
of Berkeley, California.61 These contracts are legally binding and
subject to audits and a verification process, 62 but there is no
mandatory government oversight.63
While voluntary carbon offsets have become increasingly
popular as a means of bolstering corporate green credentials and
assuaging individual environmental guilt, their near total lack of
regulation makes them ripe for exploitation. A fundamental
concern is what a "carbon offset" really represents. Although in
theory an offset should mitigate carbon dioxide produced by one
company through subsidies or other incentives designed to
56 Dean Scott, F.T.C. Moves Toward Revision of Green Guides to Cover
Marketing Claims of Carbon Offsets, 38 ENVTL. REP. CURRENT DEV. (BNA)
2557 (2007).
57 Amy Rinard, Farmers Cashing In On Carbon Credits, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Feb. 5, 2oo8, http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id= 714488.
58 Ball, supra note 52, at AI 3 .
51 Story, supra note 5 1.
60 Rinard, supra note 57.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Fahrentholt, supra note 49, at Ai. For a discussion of recently
withdrawn California Assembly bill AB I85I that would have imposed
regulations on that state's voluntary carbon offset market, see Jeremy Schiffer,
Voluntary Carbon Offset Market Escapes California's Regulation Attempt,
Sept. 2, 2008, available at http://climateintel.com/2oo8/o9/02/voluntary-
carbon-offset-market-escapes-californias-regulation-attempt/ (last accessed
Oct. 19, 2008).
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increase sustainable practices or renewable energy production
elsewhere, in practice they appear to achieve much less." Rather
than funding new developments in sustainable farming or wind
energy, for example, carbon offsets often provide a bonus to
people already engaged in environmentally-friendly practices by
allowing them to receive financial assistance, which is intended to
encourage conversion to such practices, to support techniques
they already use.65  While beneficial to those running
environmental initiatives, this practice of rewarding those
already practicing environmentally friendly techniques does not
necessarily equate to an increase in the amount of renewable
energy or no-till farmland available. "Additionality," the idea
that a carbon offset should cause a new reduction in emissions
that would not have happened without the credit, is widely
considered by environmental groups to be absolutely essential to
the value of carbon credits.66 Current voluntary carbon offsets do
not even guarantee that consumer funds will support active
projects, let alone those that meet the additionality requirement.
For example, one of the projects. funded by the House of
Representatives carbon offsets ended a full year before the credits
were purchased 67
Closely related to the problem of additionality is the issue
of substantiation, which impacts businesses and consumers alike.
Adequate substantiation for claims of "carbon neutral" status
should require "competent and reliable scientific evidence," but
the meaning of this phrase is still very much open to debate.s
Merely determining whether a project benefits the environment
poses a formidable scientific and administrative challenge. But a
number of additional concerns must also be addressed.69 The
effects of the projects on the environment, the responsible
distribution of carbon offset funds and the continued monitoring
of advertising claims also will play substantial roles in any plan to
64 Rinard, supra note 5 7.
65 Id.
66 Fahrenthold, supra note 49, at Ai.
67 Id. Carbon offsets carry an additional risk even where they provide
additionality and a tangible environmental benefit: Companies may
manipulate their pollution levels in order to take advantage of carbon credits,
undermining the offset market and mitigating environmental benefits.
68 Tracy Heinzman and Hugh Latimer, Understanding the Carbon
Footprint-New Green Advertising Claims Under Scrutiny Despite Lack of
FTC Guidelines, METRO. CORP. COUNS., April 2008, at 29,
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2oo8/Apri/2 9A.pdf.
69 Id.
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regulate the carbon offset market.70 At the same time, consumers
have no consistent information upon which to form opinions
about carbon offsets.7' Even experts have not reached a
consensus about the appropriate means by which to market
carbon credits,72 making it impossible for consumers to do so.
IV. ALTERNATIVES ABOUND
A. The Power of an Educated Public
As the Guides now stand, the only way for a company to
use an environmental claim and avoid the FTC's attention is to
immediately follow the claim with a small paragraph qualifying
every word of the claim such that the public has no doubt as to
the product's environmental impact.73 Such an approach is
necessary, the FTC argues, in order to protect an unsuspecting
public that is likely to believe miraculous things about nearly any
product carrying an environmentally friendly-sounding package,
sticker, or ad campaign.74 While this may be true, the most
effective response may not be dumbing down and endlessly
qualifying the claims themselves, or constantly chasing the
public's perception of terms' meaning and then changing the
standards of acceptable advertising accordingly. Such a system
lacks predictability for companies and the public, and does not
serve the environmental interests of either. Even worse, from an
environmental standpoint, is the fact that the companies doing
the marketing always have the upper hand, as they have the
freedom to create increasingly nebulous and meaningless yet
sweet-smelling claims while the FTC sits by and waits to
accumulate research on the public's perceptions of the claim
before negotiating the terms' qualifications."
Rather than continuing to mold companies'
environmental claims to meet the public's "standard"
perceptions, as the FTC has done, perhaps the solution to
effective and accurate advertising lies in educating and. molding
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
71 See generally i6 C.F.R. §§ 260.6, 260.7 (providing specific examples of
environmental claims and the descriptive language that must be included on a
product in order to substantiate the claim).
71 Starek, supra note 3, at 3.
11 See 72 Fed. Reg. 66,o9I, supra note 2, at 5.
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the public understanding of the technical meaning behind
standard claims made by companies. Permitting companies to
use standard claims with objective requirements, perhaps along
the lines of the EPA's Energy Star program, would create a
uniform, predictable system that the public could easily learn and
understand.76 At least one commentator has proposed this
solution, arguing that the creation of uniform regulations would
be supported by most involved parties and would allow the FTC
to "more readily determine the deceptiveness" of a company's
marketing scheme." A program designed along these lines would
have the added benefit of encouraging consumers to take an
active role in ensuring companies' compliance by providing them
with an objective set of standards by which to measure
companies' advertising claims, and to report businesses not living
up to applicable standards.
Although it may pose administrative problems initially,
creating uniform standards would likely be of particular benefit
to consumers who purchase carbon credits. Having a nationally
recognized program to certify carbon offset projects and monitor
compliance with regulatory standards would remove much of the
confusion that plagues the carbon offset market. By defining
appropriate projects and setting consistent requirements,
businesses and consumers alike would be assured that their
contributions to greenhouse gas emissions reductions reach their
intended targets. This would effectively guarantee reliable and
accurate advertising claims by businesses while encouraging
businesses to take an active interest in the projects that their
carbon offset money supports and their advertising dollars
publicize.78
Obviously, such an ambitious undertaking would require
a massive initial investment into researching not only what
constitutes an environmentally beneficial project, but also in how
best to effectuate compliance in an area of environmental
advocacy that is likely to continue to innovate at a rapid rate.
Even following successful establishment, a regulatory program
76 Cavanagh, supra note i8, at 175-76.
77 Id.
78 See Story, supra note 51. Some companies, like Gaiam, a yoga
equipment company, have already begun to take an active role in
substantiating the environmental credentials of projects they fund through
carbon credits. In Gaiam's case, when the company decided to sell offsets for
shipping to consumers, the general manager personally visited one of the
project's sites to verify the accuracy of its environmental claims.
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with uniform standards would face a challenge that the EPA's
Energy Star program does not: Constant need for oversight to
ensure continued compliance with program standards. While the
EPA can award an Energy Star rating to an individual product
once and be confident that the product's qualities will remain
consistent until replaced with a new product requiring
certification, ongoing and continuous monitoring would be
required for a number of carbon offset programs, such as eco-
friendly agriculture and reforestation, that do not function on
such discrete terms.
B. EPA Partnership Potential
While the FTC has gone to great lengths to tout the
effectiveness of its non-mandatory, case-by-case approach to
molding companies' environmental advertising claims to meet
the likely perception of such claims by the masses,79 the problems
with such an approach are self-evident. Although a non-
mandatory set of guidelines can indeed provide "safe harbors" for
companies seeking to promote the environmentally friendly
nature of their products,"° the repercussions for companies
seeking to evade such restrictions are minimal." Virtually no
barrier exists to prevent a company from manufacturing its own
environmentally conscious-sounding terms that the FTC simply
has not gotten around to regulating yet and marketing them until
the FTC manages to define voluntary standards for the
"misleading" term. This is likely to prove especially true in the
carbon offset industry, where studies demonstrating the
legitimate environmental benefits from new energy and
agricultural technology are outpaced by creative new
experiments. 2 Few barriers would exist to prevent businesses
from buying or selling carbon offsets supporting projects of
questionable environmental value while still touting the business'
environmental commitment.
Although admittedly pessimistic toward industry, such a
view highlights one of the Guides' inherent problems: As long as
companies profit from making environmental advertising claims,
they will continue to do so, and likely without resorting to the
costly expenditures necessary to truly improve the products they
71 See generally Starek, supra note 3.
80 16 C.F.R. § 260.3.
81 See id. at 12.
82 Ball, supra note 52, at AI3.
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advertise. As noted, this trend by companies to resort to
"greenwashing" has already been well-documented by
environmentalists and industry insiders alike."3 Without an
ability to enforce its recommendations, the FTC is likely to
remain several steps behind greenwashers, unable to predict their
next moves and equally unable to respond with appropriate
standards and effective enforcement without another complicated
and lengthy Guides review process.
One possible solution would be for the FTC to join forces
with the EPA and create a comprehensive regulatory system to
oversee all aspects of manufacturers' interactions with the
environment, which Kimberly Cavanagh argued is the only way
to create effective management of environmental claims.84 She
suggested that the EPA's proposal to create voluntary national
standards for the use of environmental claims and determining
products' environmental benefits, shelved with the creation of the
Guides, should be resurrected and implemented through the
EPA's lawmaking mandate with the help of the FTC.8" She also
indicated that an additional step should be taken by
implementing the EPA's Life Cycle Assessment program. 6 This
program evaluates the environmental impacts of the process that
a product goes through, from cultivation of the raw materials to
completed product to the used product's end. This step,
combined with a collective effort on the part of the FTC and
EPA "will positively enhance the reliability and consumer
comprehension of 'green' claims," thus achieving the primary
objectives of the Guides revision." 88
There would likely be drawbacks to an EPA-FTC
8 Green Marketing and the Menace of Greenwashing, ICMR CASE
STUDIES AND MANAGEMENT RESOURCES, available at http://www.icmrindia.
org/business%2oUpdates/micro%2ocasestudies/MarketingMCMKoo2 5 .htm
(last accessed May I5, 2oo8), 1-3. The recently created Greenwashing Index,
announced at the 2007 UN Climate Change Conference in Bali, Indonesia,
allows consumers to rate product claims based on their tendency to mislead
through words or visuals, vague language, exaggerations, and omissions. In
addition to the public's role in exposing greenwashing, the news media and
several watchdog organizations have worked to expose companies' attempts to
brighten their corporate image through greenwashing. Id. at 5, 22.
" Cavanagh, supra note i8, at 172-76.
85 Id. at 173-74.
86 Renate Gertz, Eco-Labelling-A Case for Deregulation? 4 LAW,
PROBABILITY, & RISK, 127, 132 (2007); Cavanagh, supra note ig, at 175.
87 Cavanagh, supra note 18, at 166-67.
s Id. at 176.
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partnership system. It would need to be centralized, would not
allow for a great amount of flexibility, and the regulations would
likely be litigated.89 But it would likely further the overall goals
of predictability and consistent regulation. The current system of
voluntary adherence to FTC suggestions begs companies to
concoct creative claims because there is little or no economic loss
in the event that they are caught.9" A system with stronger
penalties and mandatory adherence to more comprehensive,
technically based definitions would force companies to take a
hard look at their advertising strategies, and may even encourage
the development of more ecologically-minded production
strategies and techniques that permit the company to boast even
greater environmental benefits.
C. Eco-labeling
Another possibility to increase predictability and
accountability in environmental advertising claims would be to
embrace eco-labeling on a broad scale, which the United States
has been hesitant to do, with the exception of the EPA's Energy
Star program.9' The European system of eco-labeling, pioneered
in Germany and later adopted with a different name and symbol
by the European Union, is intended to provide consumers with
information when shopping. Unlike similar American
initiatives such as the Energy Star program, however, the
European system is predominantly deregulated. The idea
behind eco-labeling is to encourage the desired behavior, here
accurate advertising claims, through financial incentives rather
than government-imposed legal coercion.94 By setting standards
for obtaining the eco-label at a level high enough that few
manufacturers qualify,, the hope is that other companies will
work to obtain the heightened level of environmental benefit in
order to use the label, thus translating into an incentivized
method of improving product manufacturing standards.
Through incentive-based eco-labeling programs, companies are
encouraged not just to use accurate claims when marketing
89 Gertz, supra note 86, at 129.
10 See Starek, supra note 3, at 12.
9' Cavanagh, supra note i8, at 167-68.
9? Gertz, supra note 86, at 128.
13 Id. at 12 9.
94 Id.
9s Id. at 133.
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products, but also to develop 'more environmentally-friendly
production methods. 6
This method allows companies to pay a private agency for
the right to display a label indicating their relative environmental
friendliness, which is then supposed to translate into an increased
market share for their products over those that do not carry the
label." In this way, eco-labeling's success is based on
manufacturers' abilities to produce ecologically-conscious items
that respond to consumer demand. 8 This system is particularly
attractive for manufacturers, who may see increased profits as a
result of their participation in the program. Without
increasingly stringent standards, however, it is unlikely that such
a program will encourage considerable improvement in
environmentally conscious production strategies, because the
incentive does not extend past the requirements a company must
meet to obtain the preferred labeling. 100
Where used in the United States under the auspices of the
EPA's Energy Star program, eco-labeling has had noticeable
96 Gertz, supra note 86, at 129. Eco-labeling systems follow three steps:
establishing product categories; examining the harm products cause to the
environment throughout their lifecycles; and determining standards that the
products must meet to be eligible for the eco-label. Id. at 132-33.
" Id. at 130-31.
9' Id. at 13'.
11 See id. at Table i, Table 2. An evaluation of European Flower and
Blue Angel eco-labeling programs has produced mixed results as to
improvements in customer response and product sales following display of the
eco-label. Id. Where more than half of companies indicated that the
statement "use of eco-label has produced positive customer response" applied
completely or mostly, only ten percent of companies agreed that their product
sales noticeably increased because of the eco-label. Id.
"o See id. at 133. As Gertz notes, current eco-labeling programs generally
set environmental requirements at a level where only a few products qualify to
bear the label. Id. In addition, some programs require that products have the
potential to make a substantial improvement in market share because of the
label in order to create further economic incentives for manufacturers. Id.
However, no eco-labeling program has yet to set standards high enough that
all current products would have to improve their environmental credentials in
order to qualify for the label. Id. Although problematic for other reasons,
including its potential inability to attract companies willing to make
substantial product changes in exchange for nothing more than the contractual
right to bear an eco-label, such a program would at least encourage green
product improvement to a greater degree than current eco-labeling programs.
A labeling program with increasingly stringent requirements, though possibly
unpredictable for companies, would resolve the failure of current systems to
encourage ongoing product improvement.
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success,' 0' and at least two private organizations have sprung up
to provide the American equivalent of the German and European
deregulated labeling systems."2 One of these programs, Green
Seal, mimics the "Blue Angel" labeling program, which has seen
considerable success in Germany, by using a product's
environmental attributes from start to finish creating quantitative
data which consumers can use to make decisions about that
product's environmental superiority.13 Products certified under
the program must meet certain criteria, after which they receive a
seal to display on the product, and marketers can then capitalize
on the seal's environmental endorsement. 1°4 A second American
eco-labeling program, the "Environmental Report Card," offers a
unique approach. 05 This program, a content-neutral scheme, is
intended only to give consumers information about a product's
main environmental impacts in the same way that a nutrition
label provides information about a product's fat and sodium
content.' 06
Combining a program like the "Environmental Report
Card," Green Seal, or Energy Star with enforceable EPA and
FTC regulations would likely provide an incentive for
manufacturers and marketers not only to create effective
advertising for environmentally beneficial products, but also to
make those products increasingly green.107  The objective,
technical standards required to obtain the label solve the current
problem of unpredictability by removing the always-shifting
customer perception-based "safe harbors" and substituting easily
tested product attributes.108 Although early reports do not show
much financial gain for products using European eco-labels, 09
thus raising questions about their ability to provide a financial
incentive for companies to pursue environmentally beneficial
products, allowing such programs to continue in tandem with
enforceable federal environmental regulations permits market
forces to aid in regulating companies' behavior, much as they do
under the Guides. These products would also relieve the FTC of
101 Cavanagh, supra note i8, at 168-69.
10' Id. at 201.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Cavanagh, supra note 18, at 203.
07 Id. at 173-74.
108 Gertz, supra note 86, at 33.
109 Id. at Table i, Table 2.
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much of the burden of research and regulation by focusing its
attention on the limited number of programs rather than
hundreds of individual companies and thousands of products.
V. CONCLUSION: THE NEXT GENERATION OF GREEN
REGULATION
In a time when only one product out of a thousand carries
an accurate description of its environmental credentials,11 ° the
FTC appears to be drowning in deceptive advertising it is
powerless to stop. The battle over the current Guides revision is
nothing less than a battle over consumer confidence in the
environmental credentials of industry. In the absence of effective
regulation, the movement toward environmentally conscious
products is likely to take a serious hit, as consumers will be
unable to discern legitimately environmentally friendly products
produced with actual "green" manufacturing techniques from
those who make grandiose claims with little substantiation."'
Although options for reforming the Green Guides are
plentiful, a partnership with the EPA, whose mandate includes a
number of areas the FTC also seeks to regulate, may provide the
desired combination of predictability and enforceability that will
ensure the quality of "green" products in the future. When
combined with deregulated eco-labeling programs, such
regulations can provide a "carrot-and-stick" approach to
curtailing deceptive environmental advertising claims that is
likely to encourage manufacturer and marketer compliance with
a minimum of legal coercion. The combination approach has the
added benefit of encouraging increasingly stringent
environmental standards for products, which the Green Guides
cannot provide in their current form.
As long as the "green" movement continues,
manufacturers will seek to capitalize on it through creative
marketing strategies. Under the current Guides, which are
unwieldy, unpredictable, and lack the force of law, it is likely that
marketers will concern themselves with consumers' reasonable
inferences about their environmental advertising claims, many of
which are likely to attribute additional benefits to a product with
even a modest claim. There is simply no incentive for businesses
to curtail potentially deceptive advertising. While the Guides do
110 Green, supra note 34, at i.
,', Melillo, supra note 29, at 13.
[Vol. 2 1:1
2008] EVALUATION OF GREEN GUIDES REVISIONS 95
not necessarily need to be rescinded, the incorporation of EPA
regulations, perhaps in tandem with private eco-labeling
programs and certainly with the continued use of the Energy Star
label, can resolve their shortcomings while simultaneously
encouraging the development of more environmentally-friendly
production techniques and inspiring consumers to become
increasingly educated about the environmental impacts of the
products they buy.
